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Book Review: A Europe Made of Money: The Emergence of the
European Monetary System
The current crisis in the eurozone has roots going back four decades to the negotiations that
eventually led to the introduction of the Euro. In A Europe Made of Money , Emmanuel
Mourlon-Druol examines those negotiations and the politics and motivations of those that
participated. Aidan Regan finds that the book illustrates the important role played by political
elites and EU institutions in shaping Europe’s economic and monetary union, and is a crucial
read for those wanting to understand the eurozone’s current problems.
A Europe Made of Money: The Emergence of the European Monetary
System. Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol. Cornell University Press. 2012.
Find this book: 
This book sets out to answer the question: why and how did a
consensus emerge on the need to establish the European Monetary
System (EMS) in the mid to late-1970s? The book’s major contribution is
clear historic-empirical evidence that the negotiation of  monetary policy is
a deeply conf lictual and polit ical process. Emmanuel Mourlon-
Druol, Research Associate at the University of  Glasgow, argues against
the dominant narrative that it was the EU Commission, and its president
Roy Jenkins, that f acilitated the move f rom the ‘snake’ system to the
EMS. The book argues that the EU Commission reacted to a process
that was already in the making and primarily driven by the stability
oriented economic policies of  a Franco-German alliance. The underlying
technical f oundations are traced through a series of  reports emanating
f rom various f ormal and inf ormal policy committees. Hence, the author
traces the consensus on the need f or monetary co-operation, which
subsequently became the vehicle f or European integration, to a learning process among a
transnational monetary elite and the emergence of  the European Council. What exactly is
meant, however, by this learning process, and the extent to which it was the EU Council or the
interests of  heads-of -government that mattered most, is not entirely clear, a problem I will return
to.
The book presents an impressive amount of  evidence in tracing the precise diplomatic relations
and technical reports that underpinned the creation of  the EMS. The book begins with a f ocus on the new
French administration under the polit ical leadership of  Valéry Giscard in 1974 and his relationship with the
German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt. Their personal experience and expertise in f inancial and monetary
issues, in the context of  an international economic crisis provided the conditions f or a renewed f ocus on
exchange rate stability. It describes the French init iative, aimed at a new monetary policy f or Europe: the
Fourcade Memorandum, which argued in f avour of  creating a new European Unit of  Account (EUA), a policy
backed by the EU Commission, and subsequently ref lected in their study on EMU; the Marjolin Report. Both
reports were ult imately shelved but exposed a crucial polit ical debate that would divide policymakers
throughout the period: will monetary integration induce economic convergence? Schmidt was f irmly in the
‘economist’ camp and argued that economic convergence, particularly in relation to inf lation and budgetary
stability, must be a precondition f or monetary integration. The Commission, particularly Roy Jenkins, f ell
into the monetarist camp.
The book then goes on to describe the role of  the EU Council in f acilitating heads-of -government,
particularly Schmidt and Giscard, to thrash out their diplomatic dif f erences on monetary co-operation.
German interests were crucial throughout this period, and monetary co-operation was primarily considered
a tool of  f oreign policy. Most EEC states, with the exception of  the UK, agreed to shif t their domestic
polices to promote low inf lation. The author details the interplay between technical and polit ical debates
and their culmination in a Dutch init iative: the ‘Duisenberg’ proposals. The Dutch proposal introduced some
new ideas into EEC monetary debates but the main ef f ect was to get national governments to think beyond
the rigid demarcation between snake and non-snake members.
The author convincingly argues that it was the succession of  new EU council meetings, f rom Copenhagen
to Bremen in 1978 that mattered most in shaping the f inal consensus on the EMS. The Commission
certainly played a new leadership posit ion on monetary issues but the technical work had been thrashed
out by a small number of  individuals in specialised committees and inf ormal working groups, particularly
those nominated by heads of  government. The polit ical will necessary to f orge a technical idea into an
agreed monetary policy ult imately came f rom Britain’s self -exclusion and German acceptance. The author
concludes that the EMS was really an extension of  the Snake and a recycling of  ill- f ated proposals rather
than a new economic breakthrough.
The new exchange rate system ref lected the core policy pref erence of  the Bundesbank, particularly a
consensus on stability-oriented economic policies and the f ight against inf lation. The French, Irish and
Italian governments all signed up to a monetary regime that would provide an anchor f or their new approach
to domestic stability-oriented economic management. Germany compromised very litt le, and ref lected in
their ref usal to countenance any f orm of  f ederal-based resource transf ers via the EEC budget. The f inal
outcome ult imately ref lected the distribution of  power amongst EEC member-states, although the author
does not state it as such because he interprets the polit ics of  monetary co-operation as a process of
social learning.
There are two problems with this book. First, the author underestimates the importance of  domestic
material interests in the creation of  EMS. Polit ical elites certainly mattered but whether the polit ics of  co-
operation was a process of  social learning is highly questionable. One could easily interpret the evidence
that the outcome was driven by the bargaining power of  Franco-German elites devising monetary policies in
the material interests of  their domestic economic and polit ical constituents. It should come as no surprise
that the consensus that eventually emerged was based on a Bundesbank inspired conservativism that
ef f ectively ignored the importance of  redistribution and budgetary transf ers. In this regard it is hard to see
who was actually learning but it is clear to see which interests dominated the process. The EU council
certainly had a role to play to f raming the debate. But it begs a f urther question: was it the EU Council in-
itself  or inf luential heads of  government that mattered most? That is, was the EU Council an instrument f or
domestic interests or transnational ones? The economic arguments put f orward by the UK against EMS are
somewhat dismissed by the author as polit ical posturing but the implications of  an asymmetrical monetary
union have since proven to be correct.
Second, the author presents an overwhelming amount of  inf ormation that could be summarised and
organised more ef f iciently. It is a long tedious book that will be inaccessible f or many readers. It identif ies
so many f actors and events in explaining the outcome (the creation of  EMS) that the reader is of ten lef t
conf used as to what really mattered and what did not. The f ollowing quote illustrates the point:
“One of my central themes is the complex interlinkage between domestic politics, economic
policy, international developments, institutional issues, economic thought, and even apparently
remote topics such as defence issues and memory”.
Perhaps it is a methodological dif f erence between social scientists and historians, but when an author
attempts to include everything in their explanatory f ramework they run the risk of  interpretive conf usion.
The implication is that the reader ends up interpreting the evidence in a potentially very dif f erent way than
was intended by the author. Of  course the interaction of  transnational, national and supranational f actors
explain European monetary co-operation, but the more interesting question is which mattered the most. I
would argue based on the evidence presented that it was national interests.
Despite these theoretical and methodological shortf alls, the book is an excellent contribution to European
economic history. It illustrates the crit ical role of  polit ical elites and European institutions, particularly the
EU Council, in shaping the multi- level governance f ramework of  EMU. It is crucial reading f or those wanting
to understand the problems af f licting the Eurozone today.
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